Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
New interface
Journal articles

Les modèles de comportements adaptatifs appliqués à l'oligopole de Cournot

Abstract : This paper examines a recurrent oligopoly game, where firms imitate the most successful behaviors in their memory. We intend to characterize stochastically stable states. Several models are considered which differ in the specification of players' memory. We note that the specification of memory plays a key role in the selection of the stochastically stable states. Moreover, in most cases, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is not the unique stochastically stable state, and there exist cases where this equilibrium does not belong to the set of stochastically stable states.
Complete list of metadata

Cited literature [11 references]  Display  Hide  Download
Contributor : Soledad Beudon Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, December 21, 2006 - 4:37:24 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, November 21, 2019 - 1:58:59 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Wednesday, April 7, 2010 - 1:10:33 AM


Files produced by the author(s)


  • HAL Id : ujm-00121658, version 1



Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard. Les modèles de comportements adaptatifs appliqués à l'oligopole de Cournot. Revue d'économie industrielle , 2006, 114-115, pp.161-183. ⟨ujm-00121658⟩



Record views


Files downloads