A Side-Channel Attack Against the Secret Permutation on an Embedded McEliece Cryptosystem

Abstract : —In this paper, based on a thorough analysis of the state of the art, we point out a missing solution for embedded devices to secure the syndrome computation. We show that this weakness can open the door to a side-channel attack targeting the secret permutation. Indeed, brute-force attack iterations are dramatically decreased when the secret permutation is recovered. We demonstrate the feasibility of this attack against the McEliece cryptosystem implemented on an ARM Cortex-M3 microprocessor using Goppa codes. We explain how to recover the secret permutation on a toy example. Finally, we propose a promising countermeasure, which can be implemented in embedded devices to prevent this attack.
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Communication dans un congrès
3rd Workshop on trustworthy manufacturing and utilization of secure devices - TRUDEVICE 2015, Mar 2015, Grenoble, France
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https://hal-ujm.archives-ouvertes.fr/ujm-01186639
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Soumis le : mardi 25 août 2015 - 13:36:50
Dernière modification le : jeudi 11 janvier 2018 - 06:20:35
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  • HAL Id : ujm-01186639, version 1

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Tania Richmond, Martin Petrvalsky, Milos Drutarovsky. A Side-Channel Attack Against the Secret Permutation on an Embedded McEliece Cryptosystem. 3rd Workshop on trustworthy manufacturing and utilization of secure devices - TRUDEVICE 2015, Mar 2015, Grenoble, France. 〈ujm-01186639〉

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