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Differential Power Analysis Attack on the Secure Bit Permutation in the McEliece Cryptosystem

Abstract : The segment of post-quantum cryptography rises its importance with increasing improvements in the quantum computing. Cryptographic post-quantum algorithms have been proposed since 1970s. However, side-channel attack vulnerabili-ties of these algorithms are still in focus of the recent research. In this paper, we present a differential power analysis attack on the McEliece public-key cryptosystem. We demonstrate that a part of a private key, permutation matrix, can be recovered using the power analysis. We attack a software implementation of a secure bit permutation that was proposed by Strenzke et al. at PQCrypto 2008. The cryptosystem is implemented on a 32-bit ARM based microcontroller. We provide details of the attack and results using power consumption measurements of the device. In addition, we outline a novel countermeasure against the introduced attack. The countermeasure uses properties of the linear codes and does not require large amount of random bits which can be profitable for low-cost embedded devices.
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Submitted on : Tuesday, April 5, 2016 - 2:49:31 PM
Last modification on : Saturday, June 25, 2022 - 9:10:02 PM
Long-term archiving on: : Monday, November 14, 2016 - 4:59:39 PM


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  • HAL Id : ujm-01298097, version 1



Martin Petrvalsky, Tania Richmond, Milos Drutarovsky, Pierre-Louis Cayrel, Viktor Fischer. Differential Power Analysis Attack on the Secure Bit Permutation in the McEliece Cryptosystem. Conference Radioelektronika 2016, Apr 2016, Kosice, Slovakia. ⟨ujm-01298097⟩



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